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INTRODUCTION
The STS-75 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the Payload activities
as well as the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Reusable Solid
Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) systems
performance during the seventy-fifth flight of the Space Shuttle Program, the fiftieth
flight since the return-to-flight, and the nineteenth flight of the Orbiter Columbia
(OV-102). In addition to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET that was
designated ET-76; three SSMEs that were designated as serial numbers 2029, 2034,
and 2017 in positions 1,2, and 3, respectively; and two SRBs that were designated
BI-078. The RSRMs, designated RSRM-53, were installed in each SRB and the
individual RSRMs were designated as 360W53A for the left SRB, and 360W053B for
the right SRB.
The STS-75 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle Program
requirement as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume VII, Appendix E. The requirement
stated in that document is that each organizational element supporting the Program will
report the results of their hardware (and software) evaluation and mission performance
plus identify all related in-flight anomalies.
The primary objectives of this flight were to perform the operations necessary to fulfill
the requirements of the Tethered Satellite System-lR (TSS-1 R), and the United States
Microgravity Payload-3 (USMP-3). The secondary objectives were to complete the
operations of the Orbital Acceleration Research Experiment (OARE), and to meet the
requirements of the Middeck Glovebox (MGBX) facility and the Commercial Protein
Crystal Growth (CPCG) experiment.
The STS-75 mission was planned as a 14-day flight plus 2 days for TSS-1R
contingency operations, if required, plus 2 contingency days, which were available for
weather avoidance or Orbiter contingency operations. The sequence of events for the
STS-75 mission is shown in Table I, and the Space Shuttle Vehicle Engineering
In-Flight Anomaly (IFA) list is shown in Table I1. The Government Furnished
Equipment/Flight Crew Equipment (GFE/FCE) IFA list is shown in Table II1. Appendix
A lists the sources of data, both formal and informal, that were used to prepare this
report. Appendix B provides the definition of acronyms and abbreviations used
throughout the report. All times during the flight are given in Greenwich mean time
(G.m.t.) and mission elapsed time (MET).
The seven-person crew for STS-75 consisted of Andrew M. Allen, Lt. Col., U. S. Marine
Corp, Commander; Scott J. "Doc" Horowitz, Ph.D., Lt. Col., U. S. Air Force, Pilot;
Jeffrey A, Hoffman, Civilian, Ph. D., Mission Specialist 1; Maurizio Cheli, Lt. Col. Italian
Air Force, Mission Specialist 2; Claude Nicollier, Captain, Swiss Air Force, Mission
Specialist 3; Franklin R. Chang-Diaz, Civilian Ph.D., Payload Commander, Mission
Specialist 4; and Umberto Guidoni, Civilian, Ph.D., Payload Specialist. STS-75 was
the third space flight for the Commander; the fifth space flight for Mission Specialist 1
and Mission Specialist 4, the third space flight for Mission Specialist 3, and the first
space flight for the Pilot, Mission Specialist 2, and Payload Specialist. Each
crewmember is credited with 367 hours 40 minutes and 21 seconds of space flight for
this mission.
MISSION SUMMARY
The STS-75 mission was launched at 053:20:18:00.004 G.m.t. (February 22, 1996)
following a countdown that had no unplanned holds. The ascent phase was completed
without significant problems, and the Orbiter was satisfactorily inserted into the planned
orbit.
Two Orbiter problems occurred during ascent and caused concern; however, these
problems had no effect on the ascent phase. These two problems are discussed in the
following two paragraphs.
Approximately six seconds after liftoff, the crew reported that the left main engine
chamber pressure (Pc) tape meter was reading incorrectly. The meter was indicating
approximately 40-percent thrust instead of 104-percent thrust prior to throttle down
(Flight Problem STS-75-V-01). After ascent, the crew stated that the meter tracked the
other Pc meters throughout ascent, but had a bias of approximately 60 percent. The
meter went to zero during the throttle-down for the throttle bucket, and then returned to
40 percent at throttle-up after the period of maximum dynamic pressure. Downlink
showed no discrepant engine parameters, and the engine correctly responded to all
throttle commands throughout ascent.
Also at six seconds after liftoff, all four primary avionics software system (PASS)
general purpose computers (GPCs) annunciated a left main engine command path
failure message, which was accompanied by an illuminated left engine status light on
the control panel. Downlink telemetry indicated that commands had been properly
executed by the main engine controller. A flight software user note (DR 37594)
documents a condition in which the acknowledgment to a GPC command may be
missed, causing the command path message. This condition was unrelated to the Pc
meter anomaly.
An evaluation of the vehicle acceleration and preflight propulsion prediction data
showed that the SRB, RSRM and SSME performance during ascent was satisfactory.
The average flight-derived engine specific impulse (Isp) for the period between SRB
separation and the start of 3g throttling was 452.23 seconds as compared to the main
propulsion system (MPS) tag value of 452.67 seconds.
The RSRMs performed satisfactorily. The postflight inspection showed that all J-joints
(igniter and field) performed as designed. All components (case, seals and insulation)
performed as expected throughout the flight. Gas paths were observed through the
polysulfide on both nozzle-to-case joints (Flight Problem STS-75-M-01). The
polysulfide in the gas paths was soft and heat affected. The left and right wiper O-rings
had heat effects and erosion at the gas path locations. The left wiper O-ring had
0.016-inch depth erosion (worst case for this flight, but within the flight history). There
was no evidence of blow-by past the O-ring in either nozzle, and no evidence of
communication between the dual gas paths.
At 053:20:57:52.3 G.m.t. (00:00:39:52.3 MET), the orbital maneuvering subsystem
(OMS) 2 maneuver was performed to circularize the orbit at approximately 160 nmi.
The firing was 144.2 seconds in duration, and the differential velocity (_V) was
221.9 ft/sec. OMS operation was nominal throughout the firing.
The auxiliary power unit (APU) 1 fuel-pump inlet-pressure decreased below the
expected minimum of 150 psia to approximately 38 psia (Flight Problem STS-75-V-02).
This condition was caused by a slight leak past the fuel pump seal and into the seal
cavity drain system. The pressure remained steady until the fuel isolation valve was
opened when APU 1 was used to support flight control system (FCS) checkout. During
FCS checkout and entry, APU 1 performance was nominal. However, the fuel pump
seal leak recurred following each run. This condition did not cause a mission impact.
Data review confirmed that the closed indication for the LH2 engine 2 recirculation valve
(PV15) was not received when the valve was commanded closed at T-9.5 seconds.
Using engine inlet and LH2 manifold pressures, the valve was verified to be closed after
main engine cutoff (MECO) (Flight Problem STS-75-V-03). The LH2 recirculation valve
is only critical in the event of an engine-out situation when trapped LH2 in the feed
system must be contained. The condition did not affect the mission.
While Hz tanks 4 and 5 were supplying reactant to the fuel cells, the quantities of H2
tanks 4 and 5 diverged from each other, eventually resulting in as much as a
20-percent quantity difference. The cause of the difference was determined to be a
failure of the tank 4 A heater (Flight Problem STS-75-V-O4). The failure occurred
between 055:10:12 G.m.t. (01:13:54 MET) and 055:10:27 G.m.t. (01:14:09 MET),
based on correlation between heater ON/OFF discretes and the fuel cell 2 (B heaters)
and fuel cell 3 (A heaters) currents. In OV-102, the H2 tanks 4 and 5 heaters share a
heater controller, and as a result the tank heaters were cycling on and off
simultaneously.
Activation of the TSS-1R systems began shortly after 053:20:18 G.m.t. (00:02:00 MET).
During the data acquisition and control assembly (DACA) power-up at approximately
053:23:48 G.m.t. (00:03:30 MET), the tether length initialized at 23 meters instead of
zero. Evaluation of the encoder-generated telemetry during and after boom extension
indicated proper functioning, and this allowed a deployment using nominal procedures.
During the initial activation of the data display control system (DDCS), performance
indicators showed significantly low performance. Good performance was recovered
when the data cable was replaced. Beginning early in the mission, the smart flex
multiplexer/demultiplexer (SFMDM) experienced numerous core swaps and
warm-starts. These core swaps and warm starts cause an interruption in payload
telemetry while recovery procedures were implemented. The uncertainty of satisfactory
performance of the SFMDM was a major factor in the decision to delay the planned
deployment for 24 hours.
Deployment (fly-away) occurred at 056:20:45 G.m.t. (03:00:27 MET) after a successful
umbilical separation, deployment-boom extension, and initiation of satellite internal
power. All mechanisms functioned as planned and very little dynamics were seen as
the tether was deployed to a length of 19695.2 meters. At 057:01:29:35 G.m.t.
(03:05:11:35 MET), without warning, the tether broke inside the deployment boom, and
the TSS separated rapidly from the Orbiter with a AV of approximately 80 ft/sec. The
experiments onboard the satellite as well as the TSS GN2 system were safed shortly
after separation. Following the tether break, the remaining tether was rewound and
the deployment boom was retracted, stowed, and latched at approximately
057:18:58 G.m.t. (03:22:40 MET). The planned post-retrieval science operations of the
instruments in the payload bay began immediately after the boom was stowed and
continued through approximately 062:10:48 G.m.t. (08:14:30 MET). In the crew cabin,
the Tether Optical Phenomenon (TOP) operations continued through flight day 14.
Consideration was given to a rendezvous and possible retrieval of the free-flying
satellite; however, insufficient propellant quantities were projected, and no plans were
implemented.
Although all science objectives were not fully met, all science instruments were
operating and gathering data during the 5-hour period prior to the tether break.
Valuable data were also obtained after the tether break by implementing a new
free-flying satellite science mission that was replanned after the tether break. Initial
data analysis indicates that significant contributions were made toward meeting the
primary mission objectives.
In support of the United States Microgravity Payload-3 (USMP-3), a total of 10 primary
reaction control subsystem (RCS) maneuvers were satisfactorily performed during the
course of the mission.
A flash evaporator system (FES) water dump was initiated at 062:08:04 G.m.t.
(08:11:46 MET) (Flight Problem STS-75-V-05). Upon initiation, the FES shut down
without reaching the control band. The FES was successfully restarted on the primary
A controller. However, approximately one and a half hours later, at 062:09:40 G.m.t.
(08:13:22 MET), the FES shut down again. At 062:09:52 G.m.t. (08:13:34 MET), the
FES was configured to the primary B controller, and a FES startup was initiated with no
response. A second attempt at starting the FES on the primary B controller was
performed five minutes later, and the FES responded initially but shut down before
stabilized cooling was established. Icing was the cause of the shutdowns. The FES
core-flush procedure was successfully performed to remove ice from the FES topper
core.
It was initially believed that the FES icing was caused by the shutdown experienced at
the start of the FES dump. This shutdown was caused by a thermal transient seen at
the FES during start-up. To troubleshoot the FES freeze-up, a second supply water
dump through the FES using the primary A controller was initiated at 065:09:13 G.m.t.
(011:11:02 MET). The dump was terminated at 065:09:13 G.m.t. (011:12:55 MET)
when the FES core once again froze up. To eliminate the ice that was formed, the FES
core-flush was performed at 065:12:56 G.m.t. (011:16:38 MET). The supply water
dump using the FES primary B system was started at 065:18:44 G.m.t.
(011:22:26 MET) and ended at 065:21:46 G.m.t. (012:01:28 MET). The data indicate
that the performance of the primary B system was nominal.
The FES was switched to the primary A controller at 066:17:44 G.m.t. (012:21:26 MET)
in an effort to validate the primary A controller operation in the supplemental cooling
mode. This mode had been used without incident prior to the freeze-up on the A
system. FES operation was nominal. The FES was configured back to the primary B
controller at 067:16:42 G.m.t. (013:20:24 MET). The FES operated satisfactorily until
the radiator coldsoak was initiated for entry on the first landing-opportunity day. During
the coldsoak, the FES shut down on the primary B controller. The core-flush procedure
was performed, and the ice was removed. Operations on the FES were reinitiated, and
the FES operated properly throughout entry and landing.
Data review indicated that the inertial measurement unit (IMU) 3 y-axis gyro was drifting
at a higher-than-expected rate (Flight Problem STS-75-V-06). Four uplink
compensations were made to this IMU, and the observed drift rate did not stabilize.
The excessive drift signature is similar to that of an IMU gyro experiencing a lubrication
problem and the internal heat of the IMU causes a further breakdown of the lubricating
properties. As a result, the IMU was powered down at 064:00:12 G.m.t.
(010:03:54 MET) and this removed the power from the internal heaters. The reduction
of the lubricant temperature was expected to preserve acceptable performance of the
gyro to support the end-of-mission requirements. By powering down the IMU, it was
anticipated that the gyro drift would resume at approximately the pre-shutdown value
when it was subsequently powered up for entry.
A two-engine OMS maneuver was performed at 067:10:21 G.m.t. (03:14:03 MET). The
maneuver was 30 seconds in duration and imparted a AV of 49.5 ft/sec to the vehicle.
The FCS checkout was performed. During the checkout, a failure was noted in the
flight control channel 1 aerosurface tests (Flight Problem STS-75-V-07). Port moding
of flight critical aft (FA) 1 multiplexer/demultiplexer (MDM), and power cycles of FA1
MDM and aerosurface servo-amplifier (ASA) 1 did not recover the channel. The
aerosurfaces responded nominally to commands in the other three channels. In-flight
troubleshooting isolated the problem to a failure in the analog output differential (AOD)
card 0 of MDM FA1. An additional power cycle of FA1 was unsuccessful in recovering
the failed card.
In support of the FCS checkout, APU 1 was started at 067:11:20:45 G.m.t.
(013:15:02:45 MET), and the APU ran for approximately 25 minutes and 25 seconds
during which time 53 Ib of fuel were used. The long run-time resulted from the
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troubleshooting that was being performed on the flight control channel 1 failure. APU
performance was nominal. Hydraulic cooling was required, and cooling was initiated at
067:11:28:54 G.m.t. (013:15:10:45 MET) at a nominal lubrication oil return temperature
of 247 °F.
The RCS hot-fire test was initiated at 067:12:55 G.m.t. (013:16:37 MET). The firing
sequence was performed twice, and all thruster data were nominal.
At 068:00:48 G.m.t. (014:04:30 MET), IMU 3 was powered on and commanded to
standby as part of the recovery of the IMU for entry. After the IMU reached thermal
equilibrium, it was commanded to the operate mode at 068:01:48 G.m.t.
(014:05:30 MET). IMUs 2 and 3 were aligned with IMU 1 at 068:01:57 G.m.t.
(014:05:39 MET). The IMU recovery was satisfactory and IMU 3 operated nominally
with no built in test equipment (BITE) messages.
Forward link communications to the vehicle were lost at Tracking and Data Relay
Satellite-West (TDRS-W) when the S-band system was placed back in the TDRS mode
at 068:07:59 G.m.t. (014:11:41 MET) (Flight Problem STS-75-V-08). Communications
were re-established at 068:08:49 G.m.t. (014:12:31 MET) via ultrahigh frequency (UHF)
radio. The S-band system was reconfigured from string 2 to string 1 and S-band
communications were also re-established. During subsequent troubleshooting of the
forward link problem, string 2 performed nominally.
The USMP-3 systems were activated shortly after 053:20:18 G.m.t. (00:02:00 MET).
The carrier systems and experiment instruments operated well throughout the mission
with no anomalies. A total of 2340 commands were sent to the USMP-3 experiment
equipment.
The Space Acceleration Measurement System (SAMS) and the OARE operated well
throughout the flight. The SAMS and OARE personnel, working as a team, provided
critical acceleration data to the USMP-3 microgravity experiments.
The MGBX payload operated satisfactorily without any significant anomalies throughout
the mission operations. Benefiting from the extension day, the MGBX completed
129 percent of the preflight-planned science. In addition, the crew performed activities
which enabled ground personnel to complete an unscheduled facility checkout and
evaluation. Data from this operation has proven valuable in understanding the
distinguishing characteristics of MGBX components in the operating environment of
microgravity.
The Commercial Protein Crystal Growth (CPCG) Block IV payload experiment was
activated at 054:01:43 G.m.t. (00:05:25 MET) and deactivated at 068:09:21 G.m.t.
(014:13:03 MET). The Block IV hardware, which was designed, built, tested and flown
in approximately 12 months, operated nominally throughout the mission.
All entry stowage and deorbit preparations were completed in anticipation of entry and
landing. The payload bay doors were successfully closed and latched at
068:12:04.4 G.m.t. (014:15:46:04 MET). The first-day landing opportunities were
waved off because of forecasted cloud coverage at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), and
landing was replanned for KSC on the first contingency-landing day. The payload bay
doors were reopened at 068:15:06:47 G.m.t. (014:18:48:47 MET). IMU 3 was again
taken to off to preserve its operating time.
IMU 3 was powered up prior to the landing on the first contingency day, and
performance was satisfactory for the remainder of the mission. The payload bay doors
were closed for the second time at 069:08:44:16 G.m.t. (015:12:26:16 MET) in
preparation for the landing. The first landing opportunity at KSC on the first
contingency day was waved off because of cloud coverage. The deorbit maneuver for
the second landing opportunity at the KSC Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) was
performed on orbit 251 at 069:12:55:43 G.m.t. (015:16:37:43 MET), and the maneuver
was 214 seconds in duration with a _V of 359.8 ft/sec.
Entry was completed satisfactorily, and main landing gear touchdown occurred on SLF
concrete runway 33 at 069:13:58:21 G.m.t. (015:17:40:21 MET) on March 9, 1996.
The Orbiter drag chute was deployed at 069:13:58:28 G.m.t., and the nose gear
touchdown occurred 8 seconds later. The drag chute was jettisoned at
069:13:58:52 G.m.t. with wheels stop occurring at 069:13:59:26 G.m.t. The rollout was
normal in all respects. The flight duration was 15 clays 17 hours 40 minutes and
21 seconds. The APUs were shut down 17 minutes 47 seconds after landing.
During the final approach to the runway, the microwave scanning-beam landing system
(MSBLS) 2 failed to lock on in range (Flight Problem STS-75-V-09). Azimuth and
elevation data for this unit were nominal, as was performance of all parameters on
MSBLS units 1 and 3.
During the post-landing walk-around video, it was noted that the blade valve
mechanism at the left-hand aft structural-attach point did not completely close (Flight
Problem STS-75-V-10).
PAYLOADS
The STS-75 mission began as planned on February 22, 1996 with the launch from
Kennedy Space Center at 053:20:18:00.004 G.m.t. Ascent performance was nominal
and the Orbiter was inserted into a 161 by 160 nautical mile orbit. Cryogenic
consumables remained at the levels required to maintain the planned 14+2+2 day
duration capability. Prior to the planned Tethered Satellite System-lR (TSS-1 R)
deployment, an extension day was approved to allow for a 24-hour delay in deployment
of the TSS. However, TSS operations ended in accordance with the preflight timeline
and negated the need for the extension day. Later in the flight, an extension day was
approved for the United States Microgravity Payload-3 (USMP-3), resulting in the
planned landing on March 8, 1996; however, an additional day was added because of
weather conditions at KSC. The landing was completed on March 9, 1996 at 7:59 a.m.
c.s.t.
TETHERED SATELLITE SYSTEM-1R
Operations Summary
Activation of the TSS-1R systems began shortly after 053:20:18 G.m.t. (00:02:00 MET).
During the data acquisition and control assembly (DACA) power-up at approximately
053:23:48 G.m.t. (00:03:30 MET), the tether length initialized at 23 meters instead of
zero. Evaluation of the encoder-generated telemetry during and after boom extension
indicated proper functioning, and this allowed a deployment using nominal procedures.
During the initial activation of the data display control system (DDCS), performance
indicators showed significantly low performance. Good performance was recovered
when the data cable was replaced. Beginning early in the mission, the smart flex
multiplexer/demultiplexer (SFMDM) experienced numerous core swaps and
warm-starts. These core swaps and warm starts caused an interruption in payload
telemetry while recovery procedures were implemented. The uncertainty of satisfactory
performance of the SFMDM was a major factor in the decision to delay the planned
deployment for 24 hours.
Deployment (fly-away) occurred at 056:20:45 G.m.t. (03:00:27 MET) after a successful
umbilical separation, deployment-boom extension, and initiation of satellite internal
power. All mechanisms functioned as planned and very little dynamics were seen as
the tether was deployed to a length of 19695.2 meters. At 057:01:29:35 G.m.t.
(03:05:11:35 MET), without warning, the tether broke inside the deployment boom, and
the TSS separated rapidly from the Orbiter with a AV of approximately 80 ft/sec. The
experiments onboard the satellite as well as the TSS GN2 system were safed shortly
after separation. Following the tether break, the remaining tether was rewound and
the deployment boom was retracted, stowed, and latched at approximately
057:18:58 G.m.t. (03:22:40 MET). The planned post-retrieval science operations of the
instruments in the payload bay began immediately after the boom was stowed and
continued through approximately 062:10:48 G.m.t. (08:14:30 MET). In the crew cabin,
the Tether Optical Phenomenon (TOP) operations continued through flight day 14.
Consideration was given to a rendezvous and possible retrieval of the free-flying
satellite; however, insufficient propellant quantities were projected and no plans were
implemented.
A plan was developed to send commands to the TSS from an antenna located at the
Electronics Signal Test Laboratory (ESTL) at Johnson Space Center (JSC). The first
TSS pass with command capability occurred at approximately 058:16:08 G.m.t.
(04:19:50 MET). At that time, the satellite was recovered from the safed/Iow-power
mode, which had been commanded immediately after tether separation. Science was
repowered and began collecting data, which was sent to the ground through various
ground sites. Telemetry from the satellite sensors indicated that the tether and satellite
system had stabilized with a relatively straight tether oriented along the Z-axis below
the satellite with the satellite spinning at approximately 0.6 revolutions per minute
(r/min) in yaw. Part of the initial satellite reconfiguration included troubleshooting the
GN2 valve positions and performing several attempts to reinitialize the data handling
(DH) microprocessor, none of which were successful. In spite of the verified
completion of safing steps which close all valves after tether separation, the main
isolation and in-line valves were found in the open state and the GN2 depleted.
Additionally, the skew gyro, which was powered according to the last available
telemetry after the tether separation, was found in the unpowered state and this was
corrected via ground command. It is suspected that some sort of electrical anomaly
affected the telemetry, tracking and command (TT&C) decoder and DH microprocessor,
causing the DH microprocessor to hang and the latching valves to enable commanding
via the decoder.
TSS telemetry was transmitted and/or recorded via nine ground stations over the
almost four and one-half day free flight. Overall, approximately 200 commands were
sent to the satellite during the free flight to configure systems and collect science from
the Tether Magnetometer (TEMAG), the Research on Orbital Plasma Electrodynamics
(ROPE), the Research on Electrodynamic Tether Effects (RETE), the Satellite Linear
Acceleration (SLA), and the Satellite Ammeter (SA). The satellite was placed in the
low-power mode from 059:22:00 G.m.t. (06:01:42 MET) to 060:15:58 G.m.t.
(06:19:40 MET) to allow the satellite to survive until the close approach with the Orbiter
at 061:05:10 G.m.t. (07:08:52 MET). The satellite was reactivated at 060:15:58 G.m.t.
(06:19:40 MET) for a final day of science collection before the batteries were
exhausted.
The final commanding of the satellite was conducted while the Orbiter and TSS were in
close proximity. During the 50 minutes of payload interrogator (PI) coverage,
commands were sent via the Orbiter to collect additional payload bay/satellite
interactive science. During the pass, the crew observed the satellite/tether and
confirmed that the tether orientation was aligned below the satellite as the telemetry
had indicated. The last and very weak carrier signal, without telemetry, was detected
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by the Bermuda ground station at 061:11:44 G.m.t. (07:15:26 MET). Overall, during the
TSS operations, approximately 6,500 commands were sent to the payload, including
those sent to the free-flying satellite.
Science Summary
Although all science objectives were not fully met, all science instruments were
operating and gathering data during the 5-hour period prior to the tether break.
Valuable data were also obtained after the tether break by implementing a new
free-flying satellite science mission that was replanned after the tether break. Initial
data analysis indicates that significant contributions were made toward meeting the
primary mission objectives and these are summarized in the following paragraphs.
Data reflects that the current collected by the satellite at different voltages during the
deployment was significantly greater than theoretical predictions. For example, at
057:00:54 G.m.t. (03:04:36 MET), with the satellite deployed to 16.1 kilometers and a
tether electromotive force (emf) of 2862 V, a current of 470 mA was collected with the
Deployer Core Experiment (DCORE) Electron Generator Assembly (EGA) firing.
Theoretical models predicted a current of only 270 mA for the same conditions. This
may suggest the presence of ionization in the satellite's plasma sheath, a process not
accounted for in the theoretical models.
The Shuttle Potential and Return Electron Experiment (SPREE) detected Orbiter
charging of negative 1 kV with the Shuttle Electrodynamic Tether System (SETS)
25 kilo-ohm resistor in the circuit and a current of only 20 mA. The Orbiter's ability to
discharge itself may have been affected by Orbiter thruster firings which inhibited
charge collection by the engine bells.
The TEMAG investigation detected an enhancement of the Z-component of the
magnetic field at the satellite that was consistent with the measured current.
The SETS and TOP cooperated to provide observations of electron beam impingement
on the Orbiter. The measurement should provide information on surface doping by
nitrous oxide and on-beam dispersion.
The ROPE investigation observed energetic electrons, whose energy ranged up to
10 kiloelectronvolts (keV), coincident with current flow in the tether. Note that the
energy of the electron beam at the time was 1 kV or less. These data suggest possible
energization by wave-particle interaction.
Multiple electron and ion populations were observed by the ROPE instrumentation with
ions apparently being deflected around the satellite and possibly being ejected from the
satellite sheath after ionization.
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Data were gathered and impounded to aid in determining the cause of the tether break.
An investigation board was formed under the leadership of Kenneth J. Szalai, Director
of Dryden Flight Research Center, who was named board chairman.
UNITED STATES MICROGRAVITY PAYLOAD -3
The USMP-3 systems were activated shortly after 053:20:18 G.m.t. (00:02:00 MET).
The carrier systems and experiment instruments operated well throughout the mission
with no anomalies. A total of 2340 commands were sent to the USMP-3 experiment
equipment.
Advanced Automated Directional Solidification Furnace
After the initial delay in the start-up of the Advanced Automated Directional
Solidification Furnace (AADSF) because of the difference in the recalescence signal,
all of the operations were just as expected. All three crystal growths were completed in
their planned Orbiter orientations. The unexpected free-drift during the first run
provided a marker in the growth of the crystal that the Principal Investigator (PI) hopes
will provide significant unplanned scientific return. The experiment team believes that
the microgravity conditions were excellent for AADSF; however, the final proof will be
determined during the postflight analysis of the samples.
Isothermal Dendritic Growth Experiment
The Isothermal Dendritic Growth Experiment (IDGE) collected information on over 120
separate dendritic growth experiments during the 14-day mission. The experimenter
team collected over 450 electronic and photographic images which were transmitted to
the ground experiment team. These data were analyzed and intrepreted in near-real-
time for many midcourse corrections, improvements, and alterations of the experiment.
This real-time materials science-in-space experiment already shows IDGE scientists
that variations reported in the microgravity acceleration environment aboard the Orbiter
were not responsible for the observed variations in dendritic crystal growth speeds.
The IDGE also benefited by providing a path-finding operational test of commanding
space instruments from a remote site located on the campus of Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute. Remote operations such as this will open the way for International Space
Station Alpha (ISSA) experiments, where operations will span months, even years, at a
time.
Material pour L'Etude des Phenomenes Interessant la Solidification sur Terre et
en Orbite Experiment
The Material pour L'Etude des Phenomenes Interessant la Solidification sur Terre et en
Orbite (MEPHISTO) experiment operated nominally throughout the mission.
Experimenters accomplished science operations with respect to six planned Orbiter
12
primary RCS thruster firings and one planned OMS firing. As a result of the extension
day, three additional primary RCS thruster firings were completed.
The experimenters have correlated for the first time the effects of microgravity
perturbations on the homogeneity of the samples. Preliminary analysis indicates that
the influence of thruster firings is extremely direction-dependent, and this provides a
new consideration for International Space Station Alpha (ISSA) furnace design and
experiment planning. The second area studied is related to the structural change of
the solid-liquid interface as the growth velocity is increased. The experimenters' ability
to monitor the changing interface composition in real-time, using advanced
measurement techniques, allows the experimenters to make important decisions during
the experiment operations. Telescience operations allowed for real-time data
acquisition, analysis, and reprogramming.
In summary, MEPHISTO data collected during USMP-3 operations will include results
on metallurgical alloy structure formation, compositional variations in the crystals, and
the accurate determination of the transition point for structural changes.
Critical Fluid Light Scatterinq Experiment
The Critical Fluid Light Scattering Experiment (Zeno) instrument performed well
throughout the flight. After nearly 14 days of preparation -- with a series of slow ramps
in temperature and long pauses for fluid density equilibration and dynamic light
scattering sampling -- a final ramp, performed at 100 microKelvin/hour, successfully
brought the xenon sample to the critical temperature (Tc). The sample displayed this
unique condition with maximum light scattering, followed by a steady decrease as the
temperature moved below Tc, and a sudden increase in turbidity (sample
transmission). This signature was much more distinctive than observed during the
previous (USMP-2) mission and proved to be nearly 2.5 milliKelvin lower in
temperature than measurements made prior to this flight. The transition appears sharp
enough to locate the transition to + 10 microKelvin, which is unprecedented precision.
ORBITAL ACCELERATION RESEARCH EXPERIMENT
The Space Acceleration Measurement System (SAMS) and the Orbital Acceleration
Research Experiment (OARE) operated well throughout the flight. The SAMS and
OARE personnel, working as a team, provided critical acceleration data to the USMP-3
microgravity experiments. A series of tests were performed that monitored activity such
as crew movement, opening and closing lockers, galley operations, Middeck Glovebox
(MGBX) operations, etc. Using ground equipment plus special onboard displays
enabled these operations to be monitored and characterized to determine the impact
on this mission as well as future microgravity missions.
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MIDDECK GLOVEBOX
The MGBX payload operated satisfactorily without any significant anomalies throughout
the mission operations. Benefiting from the extension day, the MGBX completed
129 percent of the preflight-planned science. In addition, the crew performed activities
which enabled ground personnel to complete an unscheduled facility checkout and
evaluation. Data from this operation has proven valuable in understanding the
distinguishing characteristics of MGBX components in the operating environment of
microgravity.
The three combustion experiments conducted in the MGBX [Forced-Flow
Flame-spreading Test (FF), Comparative Soot Diagnostics (CSR), and Radiate Ignition
and Transition to Spread Investigation (RITES)] studied the effects of very low-speed
air-flows on radiate ignition, flame spreading, and initial fuel temperature on flame
propagation. The results indicated that the small thermocouples had strong effects on
microgravity flames near the flammability limit. Other results showed marked
differences between flame size, growth rate, and color with variations in flow velocity
and fuel temperature. Both smoke detectors responded to smoke from all samples. A
new phenomena was observed that is described as "tunneling" flames. These flames
propagated along a narrow path instead of fanning out from the ignition site. Another
interesting result was bifurcating cellular smoldering combustion, which appeared as an
ember eating a worm-like path across the sample and separating into two or more
embers that went on different paths.
COMMERCIAL PROTEIN CRYSTAL GROWTH
The Commercial Protein Crystal Growth (CPCG) Block IV payload experiment was
activated at 054:01:43 G.m.t. (00:05:25 MET) and deactivated at 068:09:21 G.m.t.
(014:13:03 MET). The Block IV hardware, which was designed, built, tested and flown
in approximately 12 months, operated nominally throughout the mission. Postflight
analysis was progressing as this report was written. Results will be documented in a
separate report by the experiment sponsor.
The CPCG Block IV payload contained 128 samples. Among these were samples from
the first joint U. S. - Latin America experiment in protein crystal growth. The project will
result in the crystallization in microgravity of ultra-pure samples of Tripanothione
Reductase, a DNA-grown protein expressing key features of the Tripanosoma Cruzi,
the parasite that causes Chagas disease, which currently affects 15 million people in
Central and South America. In addition to this protein, CPCG carried proteins which
are potential targets for the development of new therapeutic treatments for infections,
human cancers and diseases caused from hormone disorders.
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VEHICLE PERFORMANCE
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
Data analysis showed that all Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) systems functioned
nominally, and first stage ascent performance was satisfactory. The SRB prelaunch
countdown was normal, and no SRB Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) or Operational
Maintenance Requirements and Specification Document (OMRSD) violations occurred.
For this flight, the low-pressure heated ground purge in the SRB aft skirt was used to
maintain the case/nozzle joint temperatures within the required LCC ranges. At
T -15 minutes, the purge was changed to high pressure to inert the SRB aft skirt.
Both SRBs satisfactorily separated from the External Tank (ET) at liftoff plus
126.32 seconds, and entry, deceleration, and water impact were nominal. Reports from
the recovery area indicate that the deceleration subsystems performed as designed.
Both SRBs were returned to Kennedy Space Center for disassembly and
refurbishment.
REUSABLE SOLID ROCKET MOTORS
The Reusable Solid Rocket Motors (RSRMs) performed satisfactorily. The RSRM
prelaunch countdown was normal and no LCC or OMRSD violations occurred.
Power up and operation of all igniter and field joint heaters was accomplished routinely.
All RSRM temperatures were maintained within acceptable limits throughout the
countdown. Data indicate that the flight performance of both RSRMs was well within
the allowable performance envelopes, and was typical of the performance observed on
previous flights. The RSRM propellant mean bulk temperature (PMBT) was 62 °F at
liftoff. The maximum trace-shape variation of pressure versus time was calculated to
be 0.5 percent at 79.5 seconds on the left motor and 1.3 percent at 80.0 seconds on
the right motor. Both values were within the 3.2 percent allowable limits.
The motor performance parameters for this flight were within the contract end item
(CEI) specification limits. Propulsion performance data are presented in the table on
the following page.
The postfiight inspection showed that all J-joints (igniter and field) performed as
designed. All components (case, seals and insulation) performed as expected
throughout the flight. Gas paths were observed through the polysulfide on both nozzle-
to-case joints (Flight Problem STS-75-M-01). The polysulfide in the gas paths was soft
and heat affected. The left and right wiper O-rings had heat effects and erosion at the
gas path locations. The left wiper O-ring has 0.016 inch depth erosion (worst case for
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this flight, but within the flight history). There was no evidence of blow-by past the
O-ring in either nozzle, and no evidence of communication between the dual gas paths.
RSRM PROPULSION PERFORMANCE
Parameter
Impulse gates
1-20, 10 s Ibf-sec
1-60, 106 Ibf-sec
I-AT, 106 Ibf-sec
Vacuum Isp, Ibf-sec/Ibm
Burn rate, in/sec @ 60 °F
at 625 psia
Burn rate, in/sec @ 62 °F
at 625 psia
Event times, seconds'
Ignition interval
Web time b
50 psia cue time
Action time b
Separation command
PMBT, °F
Left motor, 62 °F Right motor, 62 °F
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
64.52
172.51
297.08
64.06
172.42
296.62
64.55
172.58
297.109
64.44
173.17
297.54
268.4 268.0 268.4 268.8
0.3664 0.3670 0.3665 0.3672
0.3669 0.3675 0.3670 0.3677
0.232
111.6
121.5
123.6
126.4
0.232
111.6
121.5
123.6
126.4
N/A
111.2
121.5
123.6
126.4
N/A
111.0
120.9
123.0
126.4
62 62 62 62
Maximum ignition rise rate, 90.4 N/A 90.4 N/A
psia/10 ms
2.8 3.0 2.8 2.8
Predicted Actual
N/A 520.8
Decay time, seconds
(59.4 psia to 85 K)
Tailoff Imbalance Impulse
differential, Klbf-sec
Impulse Imbalance = Integral of the absolute value of the left motor thrust minus right
motor thrust from web time to action time.
a All times are referenced to ignition command time except where noted by a b
b Referenced to liftoff time (ignition interval).
EXTERNAL TANK
Data analysis show that the flight performance of the ET was excellent. All objectives
and requirements associated with the ET propellant loading and flight were met. All ET
electrical equipment and instrumentation operated satisfactorily. The ET purge and
heater operations were monitored and all performed properly. No ET LCC or OMRSD
violations were identified nor were any in-flight anomalies noted.
The Ice/Frost Red Team reported that no anomalous thermal protection system (TPS)
conditions existed based on their inspection and analysis. No unexpected ice/frost
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formations were observed on the ET during the countdown, nor was any ice observed
in the acreage areas of the ET. Less than normal quantities of ice or frost were present
on the LO2 and LH2 feed-lines, the pressurization-line brackets, and along the
protuberance air load (PAL) ramps. All of the observations concerning ice and frost
were acceptable according to the controlling documentation (NSTS 08303).
The ET pressurization system functioned properly throughout the engine start and
flight. The minimum LO2 ullage pressure experienced during the ullage pressure slump
was 14.5 psid.
ET separation was satisfactory. ET entry and breakup were within the predicted
footprint, with the postflight predicted ET-intact impact point being approximately
75 nmi. uprange of the preflight prediction.
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINES
All Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) parameters were within the normal range
throughout the prelaunch countdown and were typical of the same parameters
observed on earlier flights. Engine Ready was achieved at the proper time, all LCC
were met, and engine start and thrust buildup were satisfactory.
Approximately six seconds after liftoff, the crew reported an anomalous condition with
the chamber pressure tape meter for SSME 2. Postflight analysis and troubleshooting
has shown this condition was caused by an anomalous output from MDM FF2, and the
SSME was providing the requested amount of thrust. This anomaly is discussed in
more detail in the Displays and Controls section of this report.
Postflight analysis has shown that the SSME performance during main stage, throttling,
shutdown and propellant dump operations was normal. The high-pressure oxidizer
turbopump (HPOTP) and high-pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) performed within the
specifications throughout the engine operation. MECO occurred at 508.0 seconds, and
no failures or significant problems were found.
SHUTTLE RANGESAFETYSYSTEM
The Shuttle Range Safety System (SRSS) performed satisfactorily throughout the
ascent phase of flight, as determined from the analysis of system data.
The SRSS closed-loop testing was completed as scheduled during the launch
countdown. All SRSS safe and arm (S&A) devices were armed and systems inhibits
were turned off at the prescribed times.
As planned, the SRB S&A devices were safed, and the SRB system power was turned
off prior to SRB separation. The ET system remained active until ET separation from
the Orbiter.
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE
Main Propulsion System
The overall performance of the main propulsion system (MPS) was as expected during
the prelaunch countdown and throughout the flight. Propellant loading was completed
as planned with no stop-flows or reverts. Also, no LCC or OMRSD violations were
identified.
Throughout the preflight operations period, no significant hazardous gas
concentrations were detected. The maximum hydrogen concentration level in the
Orbiter aft compartment occurred shortly after the start of fastfill operations and was
120 ppm, which compares quite favorably with data from previous flights of this vehicle.
A comparison of the calculated propellant loads at the end of replenish versus the
inventory (planned) loads results in a loading accuracy of -0.02 percent for the LH2 and
0.02 percent for the LOz The loading accuracy of both LH2 and LO2 was well within the
required accuracy of + 0.43 percent.
Data review confirmed that the closed indication for the LH2 engine 2 recirculation valve
(PV15) was not received when the valve was commanded closed at T-9.5 seconds
(Flight Problem STS-75-V-03). Using engine inlet and LH2 manifold pressures, the
valve was verified as closed after MECO. This valve is only critical in the event of an
engine-out situation when trapped LHz in the feed system must be contained. This
condition did not affect the mission. KSC troubleshooting indicates that the valve did
close and it was not leaking. Also, the valve's closed indication functioned properly.
The valve was replaced.
Ascent MPS performance was normal. Data indicate that the LO2 and LH2
pressurization systems performed nominally, and that all net positive suction pressure
(NPSP) requirements were met throughout the flight. The minimum LO2 ullage
pressure experienced during the period of ullage pressure slump was 14.5 psid. The
ullage pressure exceeded historical limits by as much as 0.5 psia from approximately
liftoff plus 75 seconds to 300 seconds, and tracked the upper limit for most of the
remainder of ascent. The pressure, however, was within the Interface Control
Document (ICD) limits. The GH2 pressurization system functioned nominally during
ascent. Data review verified satisfactory operation of all flow control valves (FCVs)
with no evidence of sluggish performance.
Approximately 6 seconds after liftoff the crew reported that the left main engine
chamber pressure (Pc) tape meter was reading incorrectly. The meter was indicating
approximately 40-percent thrust instead of 104-percent thrust prior to throttle down
(Flight Problem STS-75-V-01). A more detailed discussion of this anomaly is contained
in the Displays and Controls section of this report.
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Also at six seconds after liftoff, all four primary avionics software system (PASS)
general purpose computers (GPCs) annunciated a left main engine command path
message, which was accompanied by a lit engine status light on the control panel.
Downlink telemetry indicated that commands had been properly executed by the main
engine controller. A flight software user note (DR37594) documents a condition in
which the engine interface unit (EIU) acknowledgment to a GPC command may be
missed, causing the command path message.
Performance analysis of the propulsion systems during start, mainstage, and shutdown
operations indicated that performance was nominal, and all requirements were
satisfied. The MPS helium system performed nominally and met all requirements
during powered flight and the propellant dump and vacuum inerting operations.
Reaction Control Subsystem
The reaction control subsystem (RCS) performed nominally throughout the STS-75
mission, and no in-flight anomalies were identified during the flight or data review. The
RCS consumed 4624.8 Ibm of propellants from the RCS tanks during the mission. In
addition, the RCS consumed 2,296.21 Ibm (17.73 percent) of OMS propellants during
interconnect operations. Postlanding inspection revealed a yellowish contamination
on and around RCS thruster F1D that was sampled and sent to a laboratory for
material analysis. In addition, the inspection revealed several areas of severe ablation
in the room temperature vulcanizing (RTV)-coated thruster impingement area on the
right-hand upper body flap. This ablation was attributed to the high heat input resulting
from the heavy usage of the RCS aft down-firing thrusters.
At 059:11:05:41 G.m.t. (05:14:47:41 MET) and again at 062:02:27:52 G.m.t.
(08:06:09:52 MET), the vernier thruster F5L injector temperature dropped below the
130 °F leak detection limit because of the cold attitude, and the thruster was
deselected. After the first instance thruster F5L was deselected, the thruster was fired
continuously for 15 seconds to raise the temperature to greater than 130 °F. During
the second incident, the thruster temperature only fell to 125 °F and a series of short
thruster firings (pulses) were used to warm the thruster. The lowest temperatures
reached were 123 °F and 125 °F, respectively, on the oxidizer injector.
Several RCS maneuvers were performed in support of the USMP and all were nominal.
At 059:18:03 G.m.t. (05:21:45 MET) the 25-second primary reaction control subsystem
(PRCS) 1 maneuver was performed, using primary RCS thrusters L1U, R1U, and F3U.
The PRCS 2 maneuver was initiated at 059:20:18 G.m.t. (06:00:00 MET) using primary
RCS thrusters F3U, L1 U, R1U, L3D and R3D.
The PRCS 3 maneuver was performed at 060:18:28 G.m.t. (06:22:10 MET) with firings
by thrusters L1U, R1U and F3U.
19
The PRCS 4 maneuver was performed at 060:20:43 G.m.t. (07:00:25 MET) with firings
by thrusters L3A and R3A for 10 seconds and F5L, F5R and R5R each for 2 seconds.
The PRCS 5 maneuver was performed at 064:08:48 G.m.t. (10:12:30 MET). It was a
10-second +Z firing and used PRCS thrusters F3U, L1U, and R1U. Thrusters L3D and
R3D also fired to provide attitude correction.
The -Z axis PRCS 5D maneuver was performed to support payload operations
(MEPHISTO) at 066:08:43 G.m.t. (012:12:25 MET). PRCS thrusters L2D, L3D, R2D,
R3D, F3D and F4D were fired for 15 seconds, imparting a 6.94 ft/sec AV to the vehicle.
The
066:
for 1
L3D
+Y axis PRCS 5C1 maneuver was performed to support MEPHISTO operations at
10:43 G.m.t. (012:14:25 MET). PRCS thrusters F3L, L1L, L1U, and R3D were fired
5 seconds, imparting a AV of 2.7 ft/sec to the vehicle. PRCS thrusters F3U and
were also used for attitude control.
The -Y axis PRCS 5C2 maneuver was performed to support MEPHISTO operations at
066:10:46 G.m.t. (012:14:28 MET). PRCS thrusters F4R, L3D, R1 U, and R3R were
fired for 15 seconds, imparting a AV of 2.65 ft/sec to the vehicle. PRCS thrusters F3U,
L3D, and R3D were used to control attitude.
The PRCS 5E maneuver was performed at 066:12:48 G.m.t. (12:16:30 MET). PRCS
thrusters F3D, F3L, F3U, F4D, F4R, L1L, L1U, L3D, R1U, R2D, R3D, and R3R were
pulsed to impart a 1 deg/sec rotation about the X-axis for a total rotation of
360 degrees.
The PRCS 6 maneuver, a +Z axis RCS maneuver, was performed at 067:09:08 G.mt.
(013:12:50 MET). Thrusters L1U, R1U, and F3U were fired for 15 seconds imparting a
4.80 ft/sec AV to the vehicle.
The RCS hot-fire test was initiated at 067:12:55 G.m.t. (013:16:37 MET). The firing
sequence was performed twice, and all thruster data were nominal.
Orbital Maneuverin,q Subsystem
The orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS) performed nominally during the OMS
maneuvers and the interconnect operation with the RCS. A total of 17,418.2 Ibm of
propellants was consumed from the OMS tanks, and of that total, 2,296.21 Ibm
(17.73 percent) was consumed by the RCS during interconnect operations. The table
on the following page presents pertinent data concerning the three OMS maneuvers.
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OMS FIRINGS
Firing
OMS firing Engine Ignition time, G.m.t./MET duration, AV, ft/sec
seconds
OMS-2 Both 053:20:57:52 G.m.t. 144 222
00:00:39:52 MET
OMS-3 Both 067:10:21:00 G.m.t. 31 50
03:14:03:00 MET
Deorbit Both 069:12:55:43 G.m.t. 214 360
015:16:37:43 ET
Power Reactant Stora,qe and Distribution Subsystem
The power reactant storage and distribution (PRSD) subsystem performance was
nominal. The PRSD subsystem supplied the fuel cells 4326 Ibm of oxygen and 545 Ibm
of hydrogen for the production of 6291 kWh of electrical energy. In addition, the PRSD
subsystem supplied 156 Ibm of oxygen for the environmental control and life support
system (ECLSS). The oxygen and hydrogen remaining in the PRSD tanks at landing
were 1551 Ibm and 267 Ibm, respectively, which provided a mission-extension
capability of 94 hours with oxygen being the limiting reactant. Tanks 4, 5, 6, and 7
were depleted to residual quantities during the mission.
While H2 tanks 4 and 5 were supplying reactant to the fuel cells, the quantities of H2
tanks 4 and 5 diverged from each other, eventually resulting in as much as a
20-percent quantity difference. The cause of the difference was determined to be a
failure of the tank 4 A heater (Flight Problem STS-75-V-04). The failure occurred
between 055:10:12 G.m.t. (01:13:54 MET) and 055:10:27 G.m.t. (01:14:09 MET),
based on correlation between heater ON/OFF discretes and the fuel cell 2 (B heaters)
and fuel cell 3 (A heaters) currents. In OV-102, the H2 tanks 4 and 5 heaters share a
heater controller, and as a result the tank heaters were cycling on and off
simultaneously. H2 tanks 4 and 5 were configured for use with only the B heaters at
060:21:14 G.m.t. (07:00:56 MET). Asthe tanks emptied, the quantities converged until
almost no difference in H2 tank 4 and 5 quantities existed when the two tanks were
depleted to 1.5 and 1.1 perceni, respectively. Postflight testing determined that a fuse
in the heater controller had failed. The failure was caused by thermal cycles and not
excessive current. The fuse was replaced.
Another instance of quantity divergence occurred when the hydrogen tanks 8 and 9
showed as much as a 14 percent difference while the tanks were being depleted
simultaneously. This divergence was caused by a greater heat leak into hydrogen tank
8 (0.061 Ibm/hr) versus hydrogen tank 9 (0.051 Ibm/hr). However, because the tank
heaters are controlled individually, there was no concern regarding the ability to
deplete the lagging tank.
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Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem
Performance of the fuel cell powerplant (FCP) subsystem was nominal, and the
average electrical power level and load were 16.7 kW and 544 amperes. The fuel cells
produced 4871 Ib of potable water and 6291 kWh of electrical energy during the
mission. Hydrogen and oxygen consumption by the fuel cells is shown in the Power
Reactant Storage and Distribution section of this report.
Six purges of the fuel cells using both the automatic and manual modes were
performed. The fuel cell voltages at the end of the mission were 0.10 Vdc above the
predicted value for fuel cell 1, 0.05 Vdc below the predicted value for fuel cell 2, and
0.20 Vdc above the predicted value for fuel cell 3.
The fuel cell 3 cell performance monitor (CPM) stopped performing the self-test
function on all three channels; however, other functions of the CPM were operating
properly. The self-test function was restored during entry at 069:13:18 G.m.t.
(15:17:00 MET). No bus-tie procedure was required, since the CPM output data
continued to be valid.
Postlanding, leakage from the oxygen purge port was traced to fuel cell 3, indicating
oxygen regulator leakage. As a result, this fuel cell was removed and sent to the
vendor for troubleshooting and repair, including the replacement of the CPM.
Auxiliary Power Unit Subsystem
The auxiliary power unit (APU) performance was nominal throughout the flight with one
in-flight anomaly recorded against the APU system. The following table presents the
run times and serial numbers of the APUs that were flown.
APU RUN TIMES AND FUEL CONSUMPTION
APU 1 (SIN 203) APU 2 (SIN 308) APU 3 (SIN 304)
Flight phase
Time, Fuel Time, Fuel Time, Fuel
min:sec consumption, min:sec consumption, min:sec consumption,
Ib Ib Ib
Ascent 19:15 47 19:33 51 19:51 48
FCS 25:24 53
checkout
61:55 118 85:08 176 62:44 116Entr_
Total 106:34 218 104:41 227 82:35 164
"The APUs ran 17 minutes and 35 seconds after touchdown.
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The exhaust gas temperature (EGT) measurement on APU 2 was erratic for
approximately one minute prior to launch, and then the measurement operated
nominally throughout ascent operations. This same signature was observed during the
APU confidence run prior to flight as well as during entry. This erratic measurement did
not impact the mission. The transducer was replaced.
The APU 2 injector temperature experienced intermittent incorrect readings at
approximately 053:20:43:46 G.m.t. (00:00:25:46 MET), which was 11 minutes after APU
shutdown. This condition did not affect normal mission operations. Postflight testing
failed to reproduce the condition, and the APU will be flown as-is on the next mission of
this vehicle.
The APU 1 fuel-pump inlet-pressure decreased below the expected minimum of
150 psia to approximately 22 psia in four hours (Flight Problem STS-75-V-02). During
the same period, the drain line pressure increased approximately 0.5 psi. This
condition was caused by a slight leak past the fuel pump seal and into the seal cavity
drain system. The pressure remained steady until the fuel isolation valve was opened
when APU 1 was used to support FCS checkout. During FCS checkout and entry, APU
1 performance was nominal. However, the fuel pump seal leak was again seen
following each run. This condition did not cause a mission impact. KSC drained
approximately 98cc of liquid from the catch bottle. The decision was made to fly the
APU as-is on the next mission of this vehicle.
Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler Subsystem
The overall subsystem performance was nominal with the exception of a slight under-
cooling condition (271 °F) and two minor over-cooling conditions on water spray boiler
(WSB) 3 during entry. Also, hydraulic system 1 did not achieve heat exchanger mode
during entry or postlanding. None of these conditions impacted the mission.
During FCS checkout, APU 1 ran for approximately 25.5 minutes in support of the on-
going investigation of the flight control channel 1 problem encountered during FCS
checkout. The hydraulic pump was cycled between normal pressure and low pressure
at various times during the operation of the APU to conserve fuel. Lubrication oil
spraying was achieved during this extended operational period. This FCS channel 1
problem is discussed in greater detail in the Avionics and Software Subsystems section
of this report.
Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem
The electrical power distribution and control (EPDC) subsystem performed nominally
throughout the mission with one exception. A failed 5-ampere fuse in a heater
controller caused the failure of the PRSD H2 tank 4 A heater (Flight Problem
STS-76-V-04). This problem is discussed in the Power Reactant Storage and
Distribution section of this report.
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At 068:12:49 G.m.t. (014:16:31 MET), circuit breaker (CB) 59 on panel MA73C tripped
(Flight Problem STS-75-F-04). The short circuit was caused by an overload at the
output of connector J31 on panel ML85E. The thermal impulse printer system (TIPS),
which is powered through this circuit breaker, was being deactivated for entry at the
time that the CB tripped. The TIPS will be tested postflight.
Environmental Control and Life Support System
The ECLSS performed satisfactorily except for the flash evaporator system (FES)
anomaly, which is discussed in this subsection.
The redundant component checkout was performed nominally with the cabin
temperature controller reconfigured to controller 2 at 060:18:51 G.m.t. (06:22:33 MET),
and the regenerative C02 removal system (RCRS) reconfigured to controller 2 at
060:19:34 G.m.t. (06:23:16 MET).
A FES water dump was initiated at 062:08:04 G.m.t. (08:11:46 MET). Upon initiation,
the FES shut down without reaching the control band. The FES was successfully
restarted on the primary A controller. However, approximately one and a half hours
later, at 062:09:40 G.m.t. (08:13:22 MET), the FES shut down again. At
062:09:52 G.m.t. (08:13:34 MET), the FES was configured to the primary B controller,
and a FES startup was initiated with no response. A second attempt at starting the
FES on the primary B controller was performed five minutes later and the FES
responded initially, but shut down before stabilized cooling was established (Flight
Problem STS-75-V-05). Icing was determined to be the cause of the shutdowns. The
FES core-flush procedure was performed to remove ice from the FES topper core.
It was initially believed that the FES icing was caused by the shutdown experienced at
the start of the FES dump. This shutdown was caused by a thermal transient seen at
the FES during start-up. To troubleshoot the FES freeze-up, a second supply water
dump through the FES using the primary A controller was initiated at 065:09:13 G.m.t.
(011:11:02 MET). The dump was terminated at 065:09:13 G.m.t. (011:12:55 MET)
when the FES core once again froze up. To eliminate the ice that was formed, the FES
core-flush was performed at 065:12:56 G.m.t. (011:16:38 MET). A supply water dump
using the FES primary B system was subsequently started at 065:18:44 G.m.t.
(011:22:26 MET) and ended at 065:21:46 G.m.t. (0123:01:28 MET). The data indicate
that the performance of the primary B system was nominal.
The FES was switched to the primary A controller at 066:17:44 G.m.t. (12:21:26 MET)
in an effort to validate the primary A controller operation in the supplemental cooling
mode. Note that this mode had been used prior to the freeze-up on the A system. FES
operation was nominal. The FES was configured back to the primary B controller at
067:16:42 G.m.t. (013:20:24 MET). The FES operated satisfactorily until the radiator
coldsoak was initiated for entry on the first landing day. During the coldsoak, the FES
shut down on the primary B controller. The core-flush procedure was performed, and
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the ice was removed. Operations on the FESwere reinitiated, and the FES operated
properly during the extension day and throughout entry and landing. Postflight
troubleshooting lead to the removal of the system A and B topping spray valves. The
valves were sent to the vendor for testing.
The supply water and waste management systems performed nominally throughout the
mission. Supply water was managed through the use of the FES and overboard dump
systems. A total of 27 supply water dumps (four simultaneous with waste water dumps)
was performed nominally at an average dump rate of 1.54 percent/minute (2.54 Ib/min).
The line heater maintained the supply water dump line temperature within satisfactory
limits throughout the mission.
Waste water was gathered at approximately the predicted rate. Seven waste water
dumps (four simultaneous with supply water) were performed at an average rate of
1.96 percent/minute (3.23 Ib/min). All line and nozzle temperatures were maintained
within satisfactory limits throughout the mission.
The atmospheric revitalization pressure control system (ARPCS) performed normally
throughout the duration of the flight. Both the primary and alternate systems were
exercised successfully during the mission.
The waste collection system (WCS) performed nominally throughout the mission.
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Subsystem
The smoke detection subsystem showed no indications of smoke generation during the
mission. Use of the fire suppression subsystem was not required during the mission.
Airlock Support System
Use of the airlock support components was not required because there was no
extravehicular activity (EVA). The active system parameters that were monitored
indicated normal operation throughout the flight.
Avionics and Software Support Subsystems
The avionics and software support systems experienced two anomalies, which are
discussed in this subsection. Significant events involving the avionics and software
support systems are detailed in the following paragraphs.
Six seconds after liftoff, all four primary avionics software system (PASS) general
purpose computers (GPCs) annunciated a left main engine command path failure
message, which was accompanied by a illuminated left engine status light on the
control panel. Downlink telemetry indicated that commands had been properly
executed by the main engine controller. A flight software user note (DR37594)
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documents a condition in which the EIU acknowledgment to a GPC command may be
missed, causing the command path message. In this scenario, the failure clears upon
subsequent engine commands, and this condition is consistent with the signature
observed this flight. As a result, no KSC troubleshooting of this condition was required.
Data review during the flight indicated that the inertial measurement unit (IMU) 3 y-axis
gyro was drifting at a higher-than-expected rate (Flight Problem STS-75-V-06). Four
uplink compensations were made to this IMU, and the observed drift rate did not
stabilize. The excessive drift signature is similar to that of an IMU gyro experiencing a
lubrication problem and the internal heat of the IMU causes a further breakdown of the
lubricating properties. As a result, the IMU was powered down at 064:00:12 G.m.t.
(10:03:54 MET). This action also removed the power from the internal heaters. The
reduction of the lubricant temperature was expected to preserve acceptable
performance of the gyro to support the end-of-mission requirements. By powering
down the IMU, it was anticipated that the gyro drift would be at approximately the
pre-shutdown value, once the IMU was operating for entry.
At 068:00:48 G.m.t. (014:04:30 MET), IMU 3 was powered on and commanded to
standby. After the IMU reached thermal equilibrium, it was commanded to the operate
mode at 068:01:48 G.m.t. (014:05:30 MET). IMUs 2 and 3 were aligned with IMU 1 at
068:01:57 G.m.t. (014:05:39 MET). The IMU recovery was satisfactory and IMU 3
operated nominally with no built in test equipment (BITE) messages. Following the
waved-off landing attempts, the IMU was again taken to off to preserve its operating
time. IMU 3 was powered up prior to the subsequent landing, and performance was
satisfactory for the remainder of the mission. The IMU was briefly operated in the
vehicle postflight to determine its condition prior to shipment to the manufacturer for
failure analysis and repair.
During the FCS checkout, a failure was noted in the channel 1 aerosurface tests. Port
moding of flight critical aft (FA) 1 multiplexer/demultiplexer (MDM), and power cycles of
FAI MDM and aerosurface servo-amplifier (ASA) 1 did not recover the channel. The
aerosurfaces responded nominally to commands in the other three channels. In-flight
troubleshooting isolated the problem to the analog output differential (AOD) card 0 of
MDM FA1 (Flight Problem STS-75-V-07). An additional power cycle of FA1 was
unsuccessful in recovering the failed card. The MDM was replaced. Troubleshooting
isolated the problem to a failure in the power supply for the AOD card.
Displays and Controls Subsystem
Approximately six seconds after liftoff, the crew reported that the left main engine
chamber pressure (Pc) tape meter was reading incorrectly. The meter was indicating
approximately 40-percent thrust instead of 104-percent thrust prior to throttle down
(Flight Problem STS-75-V-01). After ascent, the crew stated that the meter tracked the
other Pc meters throughout ascent, but had a bias of approximately 60 percent. The
meter went to zero during the throttle-down for the throttle bucket, and then returned to
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40 percent at throttle up after the period of maximum dynamic pressure. Downlink
showed no discrepant engine parameters, and the engine correctly responded to all
throttle commands throughout ascent. Troubleshooting on the vehicle and at the NASA
Shuttle Logistics Depot (NSLD) failed to identify a problem with the Pc meter.
Additional testing on the vehicle repeated the anomaly, and isolated the failure to MDM
FF2. The MDM was replaced.
When the forward floodlights initially were powered at 055:01:20 G.m.t.
(01:05:02 MET), there were indications of arcing and that a remote power controller
(RPC) had tripped. The crew confirmed that neither the forward port nor forward
starboard floodlights were illuminated. The data review indicated that the forward
starboard floodlight tripped the RPC, and the forward port floodlight was arcing. Both
floodlights were turned off, and the starboard floodlight was considered failed for the
flight. At approximately 056:17:40 G.m.t. (02:21:22 MET), the crew successfully
repowered the forward-port payload-bay floodlight. During TSS operations, the
floodlights in use were cycled as required by the crew and functioned nominally. The
forward floodlights were replaced postflight.
When the payload bay floodlights were turned on for reopening payload bay doors at
068:14:52 G.m.t. (014:18:34 MET), a current signature indicative of an RPC trip was
observed on the mid main A bus. The forward port and aft starboard floodlights are
powered by mid main A bus. Current data and crew observations confirmed that the
forward port floodlight was illuminated. Crew observations were inconclusive as to
whether the aft starboard floodlight was illuminated. The aft starboard floodlight was
not used for the remainder of the mission. Postflight testing confirmed that the aft
starboard floodlight was failed. The floodlight was replaced.
Communications and Trackin,q Subsystems
Significant events involving the communications and tracking subsystems are detailed
in the following paragraphs.
At approximately 062:16:45 G.m.t. (08:20:27 MET), the crew reported a problem with a
cable between the video interface unit (VlU) and a camcorder. The crew reported at
064:14:46 G.m.t. (10:18:28 MET) that the VlU-to-camcorder cable had failed completely
(Flight Problem STS-75-F-03). The crew repaired the cable and it performing nominally
for the remainder of the mission.
At 065:21:44 G.m.t. (012:01:26 MET), ground controllers were unable to power-off
closed circuit television (CCTV) camera A. An hour later, the crew reported that CCTV
cameras C and D could not be powered up. Ground commanding also failed to power
cameras C and D. All other camera commands (pan, tilt, etc.) functioned nominally,
both from the ground and from Orbiter panel A7. To recover control of the cameras,
the ground cycled power on the video control unit (VCU) at 065:23:26 G.m.t. (012:03:08
MET). Power cycling the VCU cleared the logic in the video switching unit (VSU) and
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commanded all cameras to a powered-off state. Subsequently, the power for all
cameras was then successfully cycled using both ground and panel A7 commands. A
data review indicated that a ground command at 065:19:49 G.m.t. (011:23:31 MET)
rapidly switched VCU power from main bus A to main bus B. This rapid power
switching is believed to have caused the hang-up in the VSU logic. Ground checkout
was not required.
Forward link communications to the vehicle were lost at Tracking and Data Relay
Satellite-West (TDRS-W) when the S-band system was placed in the TDRS mode at
068:07:59 G.m.t. (014:11:41 MET) (Flight Problem STS-75-V-08). Communications
were re-established at 068:08:49 G.m.t. (014:12:31 MET) via UHF radio. The S-band
system was reconfigured from string 2 to string 1 and S-band communications were
also re-established. During subsequent troubleshooting of the forward link problem,
string 2 performed nominally. Troubleshooting on the ground isolated the problem to
transponder 2, which was replaced.
At 068:12:49 G.m.t. (014:16:31 MET), CB 59 on panel MA73C tripped. The short
circuit was caused by an overload at the output of connector J31 on panel ML85E. The
thermal impulse printer system (TIPS), which is powered through this circuit breaker,
was being deactivated for entry at the time that the CB tripped. The TIPS unit and its
power cable are suspected as causes of the short circuit (Flight Problem STS-75-F-04).
As a precaution, this TIPS unit and power cable were not used again during the flight.
The TIPS unit will undergo postflight testing.
During the final approach to the runway, the microwave scanning-beam landing system
(MSBLS) 2 failed to lock on in range (Flight Problem STS-75-V-09). Azimuth and
elevation data for this unit were nominal, as was performance of all parameters on
MSBLS units 1 and 3. KSC troubleshooting could not repeat the anomaly. The MSBLS
2 RF assembly was replaced and the failed unit was sent to the laboratory for testing.
Operational Instrumentation/Modular Auxiliary Data System
The operational instrumentation (OI) and the Modular Auxiliary Data System (MADS)
performed nominally during the mission.
During the prelaunch activities at 053:20:09.885 G.m.t., which was approximately
nine minutes prior to launch, a command was sent to the operations (OPS) 1 recorder
to begin recording. The recorder did not respond to the command for 21 seconds. The
delay is believed to have been caused by the tape sticking to the head. This is the
original tape and head that were installed in this recorder in April 1984. The recorder
operated satisfactorily throughout the mission. The OPS recorder performed nominally
during postflight testing, and it will be flown as-is on the next flight of this vehicle.
At 060:12:35 G.m.t. (06:16:17 MET), the primary left-inboard tire-pressure
measurement began a 38-minute period of erratic readings. At 060:13:13 G.m.t.
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(06:16:55 MET), the measurement went to a zero-count reading (231.5 psia) where it
remained for over seven days with only two spikes to the 350-psi range noted for one
data sample each. At 067:20:25 G.m.t. (014:00:07 MET), following a 23-minute period
of erratic behavior, the measurement recovered and provided nominal tire pressure
data. During the last flight of this vehicle (STS-73), this same tire pressure
measurement went to the full-scale low reading for a period of 55 hours before
returning to nominal operation. Postflight troubleshooting following STS-73 did not
isolate the source of the problem. The backup tire pressure measurement performed
nominally throughout the mission. Postflight troubleshooting identified a bad connector
that was intermittent because of wear and tear. The connector was replaced.
Structures and Mechanical Subsystems
With one exception, the structures and mechanical subsystems performed satisfactorily
throughout the mission. One of the six blades in the left-hand aft structural attach
blade valve did not fully close (Flight Problem STS-76-V-10). The blade was one of
three in the lower (outer) blade set. No ordnance fragments were found on the runway
beneath the umbilical cavity. STS-75 was the eighth flight of this mechanism since the
Program implemented the requirement for the mechanism, and the first in-flight failure
of the valve. The failure analysis showed that the blade had seized on its hinge pin.
The clearance between the blade and pin was too tight. Minor modifications of the pin
and blade bore diameters were implemented to make the valves less critical to the
manufacturing process. The NSLD modified the blade mechanism, and the blade valve
will be reinstalled on the vehicle. The right-hand blade valve was also removed from
the vehicle and sent to NSLD for modification. All other debris retention shutters
performed nominally.
The Orbiter window hazing and streaking was typical of that seen on previous
missions.
The drag chute subsystem performed properly, and all drag chute hardware was
recovered and appeared to have functioned properly. The drag chute door had
skidded along the runway and impacted a runway perimeter light. The major pieces of
the light stanchion and lens were recovered.
The tires and brakes were in good condition for a landing on the KSC concrete runway.
The landing and braking parameters are shown in the table on the following page.
Inte,qrated Aerodynamics, Heatin.q and Thermal Interfaces
The prelaunch thermal interface purges were completed nominally. Also, the ascent
aerodynamics and plume heating were nominal, as was the entry aerodynamic heating
on the SSME nozzles.
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LANDING AND BRAKING PARAMETERS
Parameter
Main gear touchdown
Nose gear touchdown
From
threshold,
ft
Speed,
keas
Sink rate, ft/sec
2294 189.3 "- 0.4
148.46472 N/A
Pitch rate,
deg/sec
N/A
--4.4
Brake initiation speed
Brake-on time
Rollout distance
Rollout time
Runway
Orbiter weight at landing
Brake sensor
location
Left-hand inboard 1
Left-hand inboard 3
Left-hand outboard 2
Left-hand outboard 4
Right-hand inboard 1
Right-hand inboard 3
Right-hand outboard 2
Right-hand outboard 4
Peak
pressure,
psia
756
648
564
636
552
540
588
612
99.5 knots
42.5 seconds
8429 feet
64.3 seconds
33 (Concrete) KSC SLF
2261312 Ib
Brake assembly Energy,
million ft-lb
Left-hand outboard 10.24
Left-hand inboard 12.45
Right-hand inboard 9.73
Right-hand outboard 13.30
Thermal Control Subsystem
The performance of the thermal control subsystem (TCS) was nominal during all
phases of the mission, and all subsystem temperatures were maintained within
acceptable limits. No TCS instrumentation or heater systems failures were identified
during the mission. A total of 21 revisions to the attitude timeline were successfully
analyzed during the course of the mission.
Aerothermodynamics
The acreage heating and local heating during entry were nominal. Likewise, the
boundary layer transition was nominal.
Thermal Protection Subsystem and Windows
The thermal protection subsystem (TPS) performed satisfactorily. Based on structural
temperature response data, the entry heading was slightly below average. Boundary
layer transition from laminar to turbulent flow occurred at 1260 seconds after entry
interface on the forward centerline of the vehicle as well as the aft port side of the
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vehicle. Surface thermocouple data are not available on OV-102 to determine if
transition occurred symmetrically from right to left on the vehicle.
The postflight inspection by the debris team also indicates that the overall debris
damage was below average. The TPS sustained a total of 96 hits of which 17 had a
major dimension of one-inch or larger. A comparison of these numbers to statistics
from 58 previous missions of similar configuration indicates that both the total number
of hits and the number of hits one-inch or larger was less than average. The
distribution of the hits in both categories is shown in the following table.
TPS DAMAGE SITES
Orbiter Surfaces Hits > 1 Inch Total Hits
Lower Surface 11 55
Upper Surface
Right Side
Left Side
Right OMS Pod
4
0
0
28
0
4
3
Left OMS Pod 1 6
Total 17 96
The largest lower surface tile damage site occurred on the right inboard elevon and
measured 5.0 inches long by 1.0 inch wide by 0.75 inch maximum depth. This damage
site plus one other nearby showed signs of thermal degradation. The tile damage sites
aft of the LH2 and LO2 ET/Orbiter umbilical, usually caused by impacts from umbilical
ice or shredded pieces of umbilical purge barrier material flapping in the air-stream,
were typical in number and size.
The X-33 advanced TPS demonstration tiles flown on the lower body flap and base
heat shield showed no signs of damage or degradation as a result of the flight. Tile
damage sites on the upper surface of the body flap outboard of SSME 3 (six places in
the RTV coated area and three places along the edge) were caused by plume
impingement from the downward firing RCS R5D thruster. This thruster firing time was
above average but within the experience data base. Visual inspection of the damage
site revealed the approximate size to be 5.5 inches by 3.5 inches by 0.25 inch at two of
the locations.
No tile damage from micrometeorites or on-orbit debris were noted on the vehicle.
The SSME 1 and 2 dome-mounted heat shield (DMHS) closeout blankets were
unstitched or torn at the 6:00 to 7:00 o'clock and 3:00 to 5:00 o'clock locations,
respectively. The SSME 3 DMHS was in excellent condition with no observed damage.
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Tiles on the vertical stabilizer stinger and around the drag chute door were intact and
undamaged
A reddish-brown discoloration similar to that observed previously on OV-105 was
present on the leading edge of the right payload bay door. A discoloration around RCS
thruster F1L was similar in appearance. No unusual tile damage was noted on the
leading edge of the vertical stabilizer. The left-hand OMS pod leading-edge tiles
sustained one large hit measuring 5 inches long by 1.25 inches wide by 0.5 inch deep
along with several smaller hits.
Orbiter window hazing and streaking was typical. The numerous damage sites on the
window perimeter tiles were attributed to a combination of new hits from the forward
RCS thruster paper cover/adhesive and old tile repair material flaking off.
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FLIGHT CREW EQUIPMENT/GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT
The flight crew equipment (FCE)/Government furnished equipment (GFE) performed
nominally. Four in-flight anomalies were identified, none of which impacted the
mission significantly.
The crew reported problems interfacing the Tethered Satellite System (TSS) payload
general support computer (PGSC) with the TSS (Flight Problem STS-75-F-01). The
crew changed computers and data ports and the interface problems continued. After
the RS422 data cable was changed, the problem cleared, and the crew reported
nominal data transfers. The cable was tagged and stowed. The cable was returned to
JSC for postflight troubleshooting.
The crew reported that the focus capability of CCTV camera C (monochrome) was poor
at far distances in low-light situations (Flight Problem STS-75-F-02). The crew stated
that camera C was noticeably worse than camera D. The camera was still usable, but
images at far distances were blurred. On-orbit troubleshooting determined that the iris
would not open with the manual command, but all auto commands worked nominally.
The camera was shipped to JSC for postflight troubleshooting.
At approximately 062:16:45 G.m.t. (08:20:27 MET), the crew reported a problem with a
cable between the video interface unit (VIU) and a camcorder. Initially, when the cable
was moved, the video became intermittent. The crew reported two days later at
064:14:46 G.m.t. (10:18:28 MET) that the VIU-to-camcorder cable had failed completely
(Flight Problem STS-75-F-03). The crew repaired the cable and it performed nominally
for the remainder of the mission. The cable was returned to JSC for repair.
At 065:21:44 G.m.t. (012:01:26 MET), ground controllers were unable to power-off
CCTV camera A. An hour later, the crew reported that CCTV cameras C and D could
not be powered up. Ground commanding also failed to power the cameras. All other
camera commands functioned nominally, both from the ground and from Orbiter panel
A7. To recover control of the cameras, the ground cycled power on the video control
unit (VCU) at 065:23:26 G.m.t. (012:03:08 MET). Power cycling the VCU cleared the
logic in the video switching unit (VSU) and commanded all cameras to a powered-off
state. The power for all cameras was successfully cycled using both ground and panel
A7 commands.
At 068:12:42 G.m.t. (014:16:24 MET), circuit breaker (CB) 59 on panel MA73C tripped
while the crew was deactivating the TIPS. Data showed that there was a current spike
and low ac phase B voltage for 0.4 second. The crew also received a master alarm
(Flight Problem STS-75-F-04). The TIPS unit and its power cable are suspected as
causes of the short circuit. As a precaution, this TIPS unit and power cable were not
used again during the flight.
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CARGO INTEGRATION
The cargo integration hardware performed satisfactorily throughout the mission with no
issues or in-flight anomalies identified.
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DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES/DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES
DTO 301 D - Ascent Structural Capability Evaluation - Data were recorded on the
Modular Auxiliary Data System (MADS) for this data-only Development Test Objective
(DTO). The data were recovered postflight and have been given to the sponsor for
evaluation. The results of this DTO will be reported in separate documentation.
DTO 307D - Entry Structural Capability - Data were recorded on the MADS for this
data-only DTO. The data were recovered postflight and have been given to the
sponsor for evaluation. The results of this DTO will be reported in separate
documentation.
DTO 312 - External Tank Thermal Protection System Performance - Photography of the
ET was acquired using the Nikon F4 camera with a 400 mm lens and a 2X extender. A
total of seven views of the ET were received for review. The -Z (far) side of the ET was
imaged. The ET was back-lit and this decreased the usability of the photographs. The
ET roll rate was approximately 0.01 deg/sec, and the ET tumble rate was approximately
0.03 deg/sec.
The exposure was good on all seven frames, and the focus was good on five of the
seven frames. Timing data were also present on the film. The STS-75 mission was the
first time that the 400 mm lens was used for the photography, and excellent results
were achieved. Additionally, no specific pitch maneuver was performed for this DTO;
however, the maneuver to the OMS-2 attitude was performed early and this enhanced
the viewing capability by providing a much larger image than previously seen. As a
result, this early attitude change may be performed on future missions.
DTO 319D - Orbiter/Payload Acceleration and Acoustics Environment Data - Data were
recorded on the MADS for this data-only DTO. The data were recovered postflight and
have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of this DTO will be reported
in separate documentation.
DTO 667 - Portable In-Flight Landing Operations Trainer - The planned operations of
the Portable In-Flight Landing Operations Trainer (PILOT) were performed by the
Commander and the Pilot.
DTO 805 - Crosswind Landing Performance - This DTO of opportunity was not
accomplished since the required winds were not present at landing.
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DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
DSO 331 - Interaction of the Space Shuttle Launch and Entry Suit and Sustained
Weightlessness on Egress Locomotion -All activities in support of the Detailed
Supplementary Objective (DSO) were completed, and the data have been given to the
sponsor. The results of the sponsor's evaluation will be reported in a separate
document.
DSO 487 - Immunological Assessment of Crewmembers - The activities in support of
this DSO were performed as planned during the preflight and posfflight crew activities.
The data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results will be reported
in separate documentation.
DSO 491 - Microbial Transfer Among Crewmembers during Spaceflight - The activities
in support of this DSO were performed as planned during the preflight and postflight
crew activities. The data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results
will be reported in a separate document.
DSO 492 - In-Flight Evaluation of a Portable Clinical Blood Analyzer (Configuration B) -
During flight day 2 activities, the Red Team members noted a high glucose reading on
both control samples. The ground operators re-evaluated the control range and
believed that the instrument was operating properly. All other crew activities were
completed in accordance with the timeline. The data from this DSO have been given to
the sponsor for evaluation, and the results will be published in separate documentation.
DSO 493 - Monitoring Latent Virus Reactivation and Shedding in Astronauts - All
planned activities in support of this DSO were completed in accordance with the flight
plan. The data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results will be
reported in separate documentation.
DSO 802 - Educational Activities - The TSS- and USMP-related subjects were
completed and recorded on video in accordance with the preflight plan. These
educational videos are now available for use as teaching aids.
DSO 901 - Documentary Television - The video in support of this DSO was recorded
and returned to the sponsor for evaluation.
DSO 902 - Documentary Motion Picture Photography - The motion picture photography
in support of this DSO was recorded, and the film was returned for processing and
evaluation by the sponsor.
DSO 903 - Documentary Still Photography - The still photography in support of this
DSO was taken, and the film was returned for processing and evaluation by the
sponsor.
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PHOTOGRAPHY AND TELEVISION ANALYSIS
LAUNCH PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
A total of 24 videos of the launch of STS-75 were reviewed for anomalous conditions
and no such conditions were found. In addition, thirty-three 16 mm films and twenty
35 mm films were also reviewed. No items of significance were noted during the
reviews of the films.
ON-ORBIT PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
The only on-orbit photography reviewed was that taken of the ET following separation
from the Orbiter. A discussion of the findings during the review of this film are
presented under DTO 312 in the Development Test Objectives section of the report.
LANDING PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
A total of 12 videos of the landing were received and reviewed following the mission.
No items of significance were noted in the video data of landing.
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TABLE I.- STS-75 MISSION EVENTS
Event
APU Activation
SRB HPU Activation a
Main Propulsion System
Starta
SRB Ignition Command
Description
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
LH HPU System A start command
LH HPU System B start command
RH HPU System A start command
RH HPU System B start command
ME-3 Start command accepted
ME-2 Start command accepted
ME-1 Start command accepted
Actual time, G.m.t.
053:20:13:10.837
053:20:13:12.307
053:20:13:14.158
053:20:17:32.134
053:20:17:32.294
053:20:17.32.454
053:20:17:32.614
053:20:17:53.458
053:20:17:53.577
053:20:17:53.698
Calculated SRB ignition command 053:20:18:00.004
ME-3 Command accepted 053:20:18:04.032
ME-2 Command accepted 053:20:18:04.045
ME-1 Command accepted 053:20:18:04.058
ME-3 Command accepted 053:20:18:36.193
ME-2 Command accepted 053:20:18:36.206
ME-1 Command accepted 053:20:18:36.219
ME-3 Command accepted 053:20:18:56.034
ME-2 Command accepted 053:20:18:56.046
ME-1 Command accepted 053:20:18:56.060
Derived ascent dynamic pressure 053:20:18:51
(Liftof0
Throttle up to 104 Percent
ThruSta
Throttle down to
67 Percent Thrust a
Throttle up to 104 Percent a
Maximum Dynamic Pressure
(q)
Both SRM's Chamber
Pressure at 50 psia
End SRM a Actiona
SRB Physical Separation a
RH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
LH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
LH SRM chamber pressure
053:20:20:00.844
053:20:20:01:444
053:20:20:03.214
SRB Separation Command
3g Acceleration
Throttle Down for
3g Acceleration a
Throttle Down to
67 Percent Thrust a
SSME Shutdowna
MECO
ET Separation
supplied data
mid-range select
RH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
LH rate APU turbine speed - LOS
RH rate APU turbine speed - LOS
SRB separation command flag
Total load factor
ME-3 command accepted
ME-2 command accepted
ME-1 command accepted
ME-3 command accepted
ME-2command accepted
ME-1 command accepted
ME-3 command accepted
ME-2 command accepted
ME-1 command accepted
MECO command flag
MECO confirm flag
ET separation command flag
053:20:20:03.884
053:20:20:06.324
053:20:20:06.324
053:20:20:07
053:20:25:31
053:20:25:31.082
053:20:25:31.096
053:20:25:31.105
053:20:26:21.643
053:20:26:21.657
053:20:26:21.670
053:20:26:28.043
053:20:26:28.057
053:20:26:28.070
053:20:26:28
053:20:26:29
053:20:26:48
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TABLE I.- STS-75 MISSION EVENTS
(Continued)
Description Actual time, G.m.t.
APU Deactivation
OMS-1 Ignition
OMS-1 Cutoff
OMS-2 Ignition
OMS-2 Cutoff
Payload Bay Doors (PLBDs)
Open
Tethered Satellite System
Deployment
Tethered Satellite System
Tether Break
OMS-3 Ignition
OMS-3 Cutoff
Flight Control System
Checkout
APU Start
APU Stop
Payload Bay Doors Close
Payload Bay Doors Reopen
Payload Bay Doors Close
APU Activation for Entry
Deorbit Burn Ignition
Deorbit Burn Cutoff
Entry Interface (400K feet)
Blackout end
Terminal Area Energy Mgmt.
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU 1 GG chamber pressure
APU 3 GG chamber pressure
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
PLBD right open 1
PLBD left open 1
Voice call
Voice call
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
PLBD left close 1
PLBD dght close 1
PLBD right open 1
PLBD left open 1
PLBD left close 1
PLBD right close 1
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Current orbital altitude above
Data locked (high sample rate)
Major mode change (305)
053:20:32:26.254
053:20:32:45.278
053:20:33:05.099
Not performed -
direct insertion
trajectory flown
053:20:57:52.5
053:20:57:52.6
053:21:00:17.1
053:21:00:17.2
053:21:42:43
053:21:44:04
056:20:46:00
057:01:29:35
067:10:21:00.3
067:10:21:00.3
067:10:21:31.1
067:10:21:31.1
067:11:20:44.703
067:11:46:08.824
068:12:01:13
068:12:03:04
068:15:05:28
068:15:06:47
069:08:42:42
069:08:44:16
069:12:50:47.230
069:13:13:24.328
069:13:13:36.081
069:12:55:43.1
069:12:55:43.3
069:12:59:17.9
069:12:59:17.9
069:13:26:45
No blackout
069:13:52:01
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TABLE I.- STS-75 MISSION EVENTS
(Concluded)
Description
Main Landing Gear
Contact
Main Landing Gear
Weight on Wheels
Drag Chute Deployment
Nose Landing Gear
Contact
Nose Landing Gear
Weight On Wheels
Drag Chute Jettison
Wheel Stop
APU Deactivation
LH main landing gear tire pressure 1
RH main landing gear tire pressure 2
RH main landing gear weight on wheels
LH main landing gear weight on wheels
Drag chute deploy 1 CP Volts
NLG LH tire pressure 1
NLG weight on wheels 1
Drag chute jettison 1 CP Volts
Velocity with respect to runway
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
Actual time,
G.m.t.
069:13:58:20
069:13:58:21
069:13:58:21
069:13:58:21
069:13:58:28.2
069:13:58:36
069:13:58:36
069:13:58:51.8
069:13:59:25
069:14:15:31.135
069:14:15:54.720
069:14:16:08.271
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DOCUMENT SOURCES
In an attempt to define the official as well as the unofficial sources of data for
this mission report, the following list is provided.
1. Flight Requirements Document
2. Public Affairs Press Kit
3. Customer Support Room Daily Science Reports
4. MER Daily Reports
5. MER Mission Summary Report
6. MER Quick Look Report
7. MER Problem Tracking List
8. MER Event Times
9. Subsystem Manager Reports/Inputs
10. MOD Systems Anomaly List
11. MSFC Flash Report
12. MSFC Event Times
13. MSFC Interim Report
14. Crew Debriefing comments
15. Shuttle Operational Data Book
A-1

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
The following is
are used in this
AADSF
AOD
APU
ARPCS
ASA
BITE
CB
CCTV
CEI
CO2
CPCG
CPM
CSR
DACA
DCORE
DDCS
DH
DMHS
DR
DSO
DTO
z_V
ECLSS
EGA
EGT
EIU
emf
EPDC
ESTL
ET
EVA
FA
FCE
FCP
FCS
FCV
FES
FF
FF2
ft/sec
GFE
G.m.t.
GN2
a list of the acronyms and abbreviations and their definitions as these items
document.
Advanced Automated Directional Solidification Furnace
analog output differential
auxiliary power unit
atmospheric revitalization pressure control system
aerosurface amplifier
built in test equipment
circuit breaker
closed circuit television
contract end item
carbon dioxide
Commercial Protein Crystal Growth
cell performance monitor
Comparative Soot Diagnostics
data acquisition and control assembly
Deployer Core Experiment
data display control system
data handling
dome-mounted heat shield
Discrepancy Report
Detailed Supplementary Objective
Developmental Test Objective
differential velocity
Environmental Control and Life Support System
electron generator assembly
exhaust gas temperature
engine interface unit
electromotive force
electrical power distribution and control subsystem
Electronic Systems Test Laboratory
External Tank
extravehicular activity
flight aft
flight crew equipment
fuel cell powerplant
flight control system
flow control valve
flash evaporator system
Forced Flow Flame Spreading Test
flight forward 2 (MDM)
feet per second
Government furnished equipment
Greenwich mean time
gaseous nitrogen
B-1
GPC
GSE
H2
HPFTP
HPOTP
ICD
IDGE
IFA
IMU
Isp
ISSA
JSC
keV
kV
KSC
kW
kWh
Ibm
LCC
LH2
LMES
LO2
mA
MADS
MDM
MECO
MEPHISTO
MET
MGBX
MPS
MSBLS
MSFC
NASA
nmi.
NPSP
NSLD
NSTS
OARE
OI
OMRSD
OMS
OPS
PAL
PASS
Pc
PGSC
PI
PILOT
general purpose computer
ground support equipment
hydrogen
high pressure fuel turbopump
high pressure oxidizer turbopump
Interface Control Document
Isothermal Dendritic Growth Experiment
in-flight anomaly
inertial measurement unit
specific impulse
International Space Station Alpha
Johnson Space Center
kiloelectron volts
kilovolts
Kennedy Space Center
kilowatt
kilowatt/hour
pound mass
Launch Commit Criteda
liquid hydrogen
Lockheed Martin Engineering and Science
liquid oxygen
milliamperes
modular auxiliary data system
multiplexer/demultiplexer
main engine cutoff
Material pour L'Etude des Phenomenes Interessant la Solidification sur Terre
et en Orbite Experiment
mission elapsed time
middeck glovebox
main propulsion system
Microwave Scanning Beam Landing System
Marshall Space Flight Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
nautical mile
net positive suction pressure
NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot
National Space Transportation System (i.e., Space Shuttle Program)
Orbital Acceleration Research Experiment
operational instrumentation
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document
orbital maneuvering subsystem
operations
protuberance air load
primary avionics software system
chamber pressure
payload general support computer
Principal Investigator payload interleaver
Portable In-Flight Landing Operations Trainer
B-2
PMBT
ppm
PRSD
psia
psid
RCRS
RCS
RETE
RITES
RM
r/min
ROPE
RPC
RSRM
RTV
SA
SAMS
S&A
SETS
SFMDM
SLA
SLF
SPREE
SRB
SRSS
SSME
Tc
TCS
TDRS
TEMAG
TIPS
TOP
TPS
TSS-1R
TT&C
UHF
USMP-3
V
VCU
Vdc
VIU
VSU
W
WCS
WSB
ZENO
propellant mean bulk temperature
parts per million
power reactant storage and distribution
pound per square inch absolute
pound per square inch differential
Regenerative CO2 Removal System
reaction control subsystem
Research on Electrodynamic Tether Effects
Radiate Ignition and Transition to Spread Investigation
Redundancy Management
revolutions per minute
Research on Orbital Plasma Electrodynamics
remote power controller
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor
room temperature vulcanizing (material)
Satellite Ammeter
Shuttle Acceleration Measurement System
safe and arm
Shuttle Electrodynamic Tether System
smart flex multiplexer/demultiplexer
Shuttle Laser Altimeter/Satellite Linear Acceleration
Shuttle Landing Facility
Shuttle Potential and Retum Electron Experiment
Solid Rocket Booster
Shuttle range safety system
Space Shuttle main engine
critical temperature
thermal control subsystem
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
Tether Magnetometer
thermal impulse printer system
Tether Optical Phenomenon
thermal protection system/subsystem
Tethered Satellite System-lR
telemetry, tracking and command
ultrahigh frequency
United States Microgravity Payload-3
Volts
video control unit
Volts direct current
video interface unit
video switching unit
Watts/West
waste collection system
water spray boiler
Cdtical Fluid Light Scattering Experiment
B-3

